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One of the most promising applications in VANETs is vehicle chatting, which allows like-minded vehicles 
to chat on the topics of common interest on the road. But, some privacy challenging issues emerged 
recently in vehicle chatting application. The probable issues are how to find a like-minded vehicle on the 
road and how to prevent one’s interest privacy (IP) from others who are not like-minded. In this paper, in 
order to address these challenging issues, we study an efficient privacy preserving finding like-minded 








Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) have been subject to extensive research efforts not only 
from the government, but also from the academia and automobile industry in recent years. In 
VANET, an OnBoard Unit (OBU) device is attached with all vehicles which allows them to 
communicate with each other, i.e., vehicle-to-vehicle (V-2-V) communication, as well as to the 
Roadside Units (RSUs), i.e., vehicle-to-infrastructure (V-2-I) communication. Now, if we 
compare it with the traditional ad hoc network, then it can be seen that the hybrid of V-2-V and 
V-2-I communications makes VANETs more promising, and it can also provide a board of 
safety-related (e.g., emergency news, warning about collisions) and non-safety-related (vehicle-
vehicle chat, sharing files, downloading videos on the road) applications which are basically close 
to our day to day activities.  
 
And because of these applications, VANETs are being attractive to the public. Though several 
researches are being conducted on VANET, but as per our knowledge, the interest privacy, as a 
special privacy requirement in vehicle chatting application, has not been yet explored much. 
Therefore, how to identify a vehicle who is like-minded and establish a shared session key for 
secure chatting, and how to prevent other vehicles who are not like-minded from knowing one 
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2. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOAL 
 
2.1 SYSTEM MODEL 
 
We consider a scenario which consists of a number of vehicles V = {V1, V2, ·  ·  ·} and a single 
offline trusted authority (TA). Since our problem is confined to the scenario where vehicles are 
required to find like-minded vehicles with common interest on the road without the assistance of 
RSUs, RSUs are not included in our current model. Trust Authority (TA): TA is a trustable and 
powerful entity. Its responsibility is to manage the whole network, such as, to initialize the 
system, to register the vehicles in the system by assigning a finite set of pseudo-IDs and the 
corresponding key materials to each vehicle. It should be noted that TA is an offline entity and is 
not directly involved in the V-2-V communications.  
 
When two vehicles Va, and Vb ∈ V are within their transmission range, they can chat on the 
topics of common interest on the road.  
 
2.2 DESIGN GOAL 
 
Security requirements and design goal: Security and privacy are always of vital importance to the 
flourish of vehicle chatting application in VANET. Without the guarantee of vehicle’s privacy 
including identity privacy, location privacy and interest privacy, vehicle chatting application can’t 
be widely accepted by the public. Therefore, it is essential to protect vehicle’s privacy. 
Specifically, the following security requirements should be ensured in vehicle chatting 
application:  
 
i) Vehicle’s real identity should be protected;  
ii)Vehicle’s location privacy should be guaranteed; and  
iii) Vehicle’s interests should be protected against others who don’t have the common interest. 
 
In regard of the former two security requirements, each vehicle can use pseudo-ID to conceal the 
real identity, and periodically change multiple pseudo-IDs to achieve the location privacy. 
However, for the third security requirement, vehicles should use some IP-preserving protocols to 
find other vehicle that have the common interest on the road. Concretely, when a vehicle Va 
wants to talk with another vehicle Vb nearby, if Vb has the common interest with Va, Va and Vb 
can establish a shared session key used for secure chatting on the topics of common interest. 
However, if Vb doesn’t have the common interest with Va, neither Va nor Vb can know the 
counterpart’s interest. Besides the above requirements, the time complexity should be less, the 
computational cost needed should be less and the protocol should be resistant to attacks. In this 
paper, these points will be taken into consideration.  
 
3. OPTIMUM BASE POINT CHOICE ALGORITHM 
 
Base point or generator point selection in ECC is the prime step for its security. The efficiency of 
the choice of base point is needed for reducing the time complexity of the algorithm thereby 
reducing the overall computational cost. So, the effectiveness of base point is necessary. Some 
chooses a random point on the curve as base point while some chooses the smallest point on the 
curve as the generator point. But there are some algorithms which gives optimum base point 
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selection method. One such method is described below and it uses quadratic residue of mod p to 
find the base point [1]. The base point of ECC on GF(p) is given below:  
 
In ECC of GF(p), p is a prime number and Fp is a finite field of mod p. ECC uses modular 




Here, a and b are the curve parameters as stated earlier. Now if there is a point (x,y) which meets 
the above equation, then the number (x, y) is a point on the elliptic curve E. E(Fp) is used to 
represent set of all point which meets the curve E. The domain parameters of ECC on GF(p) are 
(q, a, b, p, n, h ) where q is the module, a and b are the coefficient of ECC, n is the order of the 
base point, h is the cofactor of n.. Let assume a and p are integers, p>0, so if there is solution to 
x2 = a mod p, we called a is quadratic residue of mod p; if the solution doesn’t exist, a is 
quadratic non-residue of mod p. if the numbers among 1,2,…, p which are relatively-prime with p 
must be quadratic residue of mod p, but some of them may be congruent about mode p. The basic 
idea of the algorithm is that at first we have to select an effective random point on the curve and 
then scalar multiplication is done using the random point. Finally, the scalar multiplication value 
is being used to judge the base point of the elliptic curve.  
 
ALGORITHM 1: THE BASE POINT CHOICE ALGORITHM OF ECC ON GF(P).  
 
Input: a, b, p, n, h.  
 




S1. Randomly choose x (0 ≤ x < p);  
 
S2. a =(x3 + ax + b) mod p;  
 
S3. Judging whether a belongs to quadratic residue of mod p, if so y is gotten, marked G = (x, y) 
go to S4, if not, go to S1.  
 
S4. According to point G to compute G = hG, then judging whether G meets y2 = x3 + ax + b and 
G is not infinite point. If so, G is the solved base point, then go S5, if not, go to s1.  
 
S5. Return G  
 
ALGORITHM 2: TO JUDGE WHETHER A IS QUADRATIC RESIDUE AND GET THE COORDINATE Y.  
 
Input: a, p, among them, a is gotten from S2 of Algorithm 1, p is mod;  
 




S1. If a=0, return (0, 0), or go to S2  
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S2. sum←0, y←1, i←1  
 
S3. for i←1 to p do  
sum← (sum+i) mod p,  
 
if a=sum then  
 
return (a,y),  
 
else y←y+1, i←i+2,  
 
if i=p  
 
return (-1,-1)[1].  
 
4. FLIP PROTOCOL 
 
In this section, we study our basic protocol which is efficient privacy -preserving finding like-
minded vehicle protocol (FLIP and it mainly consists of two parts: system initialization and 
privacy preserving finding like-minded vehicle on the road.[3]  
 
4.1 SYSTEM INITIALIZATION:  
 
Notation: Let an integer k € N, then 1ª is the string of a 1s. If x,y are two strings, then x||y is the 
concatenation of x and y. In system initialization phase, the Trusted Authority (TA) first 
initializes the whole system by  running the following steps. Given the security parameter l, TA 
generates an elliptic curve group G = <P>, where the generator P is being chosen with the 
protocol described in section (IV).  Then, TA chooses a random number s € Z*q as the master key 
and compute the corresponding system public key Ppub = sP . In addition, TA also chooses four 
secure hash functions H, H0, H1, and H2, where H : {0, 1}* → G and Hi : {0, 1}* → Z*q , for i 
= 0, 1, 2. In the end, TA publishes the public system parameters params as {G, P, q, Ppub, H, H0, 
H1, H2} and keeps the master key secretly. When a vehicle Vi € V itself to the system, TA first 
checks the vehicle Vi’s validity. If Vi is valid, TA generates a family of pseudo-IDs and the 
corresponding key materials for Vi using Algorithm 3. In such a way, Vi can constantly change 
its pseudo-IDs to achieve identity privacy and location privacy on the road. 
 
When a vehicle Vi € V itself to the system, TA first checks the vehicle Vi’s validity. If Vi is 
valid, TA generates a family of pseudo-IDs and the corresponding key materials for Vi using 
Algorithm 3. In such a way, Vi can constantly change its pseudo-IDs to achieve identity privacy 
and location privacy on the road. 
 
ALGORITHM 3: VEHICLE REGISTRATION ALGORITHM 
 
1: procedure VEHICLEREGISTRATION 
 
INPUT: a verified vehicle Vi € V  
 
OUTPUT: a family of pseudo-IDs and the corresponding key materials 
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    2: choose a family of unlinkable pseudo-IDs PID = {pid1, pid2, ·  ·  ·  }  
 
    3: for each pseudo-ID pidi € PID do 
 
    4: randomly choose a private key xi € Z*q 
 
    5: compute the corresponding public key Yi = xiP 
 
    6: assert (pidi, Yi) with certificate certi signed by TA with s 
 
    7: end for 
 
    8: return all tuples (pidi, xi, Yi, certi) to Vi 
 
    9: end procedure 
 
B. Privacy-preserving Finding Like-minded Vehicle: 
 
When a vehicle Va € V is on the road and wants to find a like-minded vehicle Vb € V on the 
common interest Iα nearby, they will run the following steps to establish a shared session key sk 
regarding the common interest Iα. 
 
 
Figure.1: Privacy-preserving Finding Like-minded Vehicle Protocol [3] 
Step 1 
 
Va first sets an interest set I, which consists of k kinds of interests {I1, I2, ·  ·  ·  , Ik}, where Va’s 
actual interest I+ is involved. Then, Va chooses a random number x € Z*q, computes X = xH(I+), 
and uses the ECDSA algorithm to make a signature σa = ECDSA(I||X) on I||X with regard to the 
pseudo-ID pida and the certificate certa. In the end, Va broadcasts the request I||X||σa||pida||certa 
to the nearby vehicles. 




Upon receiving the request I||X||σa||pida||certa, a nearby vehicle Vb first checks the validity of σa 
with pida||certa. If it is invalid, Vb neglects the request. Otherwise, Vb chooses his interest I− € I 
and a random number y € Z*q , computes Y = yH(I−), Z = yX, and Auth0 = H0(pida||pidb||Z). In 
addition, Vb makes a signature σb = ECDSA(X||Y ||Auth0) on X||Y ||Auth0 with regard to the 
pseudo-ID pidb and the certificate certb, and returns the response X||Y ||Auth0||σb||pidb||certb to 





After receiving the responsor Vb’s response X||Y||Auth0||σb||pidb||certb, the requestor Va first 
checks the validity of σb with pidb||certb. If it is invalid, Va neglects the response. Otherwise, Va 
computes Z'= xY , and checks whether Auth0?=H0(pida||pidb||Z'). If it holds, Va computes and 




When Vb receives Auth1 = H1 (pida||pidb||Z'), he checks whether Auth1? = H1 (pida||pidb||Z). If 
it holds, Vb calculates the session key sk = H2 (pida||pidb||Z). If I+ = I− = Iα for some 1 ≤ α ≤ k, 
Va and Vb have the shared session key sk, i.e., the vehicle Va successfully finds an like-minded 
vehicle Vb on the road. 
 
As it can be seen that, ECDSA is being used for signature generation and verification, now besides 
strengthening the base point of ECC, we can also strengthen the hash function required to be used 
in ECDSA. From [3], it is not being said which hash function is used, but here we use Sha-256 in 
place of the traditional Sha-1 which is normally being used in ECDSA. The reason Sha-256 is 
being used is because of the fact that it is more secured than the other hash algorithms and 
moreover it shows efficient results while coding with java. A comparative study is being shown in 
[11, 12, 13, and 14] about the advantages of taking Sha-256 in place of other hashing algorithms. 




The efficient and optimum choosing of base point made the protocol more efficient in terms of 
computational costs. If we consider Tm being the time taken for one point multiplication with the 
generator point G and Ts and Tv the time taken for ECDSA signing and verification, respectively, 
then since these operations are mainly responsible for the speed of FLIP, we can neglect others 
such as hash operations. Now, from the FLIP protocol of [3], only 2Tm + Ts + Tv will be 
required by both the requestor Va and the responsor Vb. The execution time of Tm is being found 
as nearly 2.11 ms, that is Tm ≈ 2.11 ms, and based on the results of [7], we know, Ts ≈ 2.14 ms, 
Tv ≈ 3.58 ms for a 256-bit ECDSA. Then, the computational costs are only 2Tm + Ts + Tv ≈ 
9.94 ms. Since, efficient choosing of base point reduced the computational cost to a good extent, 
that is, the time taken to perform one point multiplication, ECDSA signing and verification, has 
been found very less and therefore, it is more efficient than the one described by [3].  
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6. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
We know ECDSA signature cannot be forged and if the transcripts are being altered by the 
adversary, it will get detected. Now in the paper of FLIP by Rongxing Lu et.al. it is already 
proved that its IP can be protected in the due time and since we also used the same tool that is 
ECC and same basic protocol, then obviously in the enhanced one its IP will also be protected. In 
addition to that we used an optimum base point choice algorithm which is more efficient
one in [3]. The base point choice algorithm reduces the time complexity to [1] which is better 
than the one considered in [3], thereby reducing the overall computational cost. Along with that, 
in ECDSA, SHA-256 is being taken as the hash function
protocol because the security of ECC lies in its efficient base point sele
function. 
 
7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION  
 
In the FLIP protocol, in order to prevent successive guessing attack from non
vehicle, the responsor Vb is only allowed to respond once for the same request. Therefore, when 
large number of interests is being considered by the requestor Va, the harder the actual interest I
€ I can be guessed by non-like-
size of the interest becomes large, it takes more for Vb to choose the correct interest which causes 
delay in finding like-minded vehicle. So, in this section we implement the protocol in java with 
the changes being made and try to record how the size of the interest affects the time taken 
required to find like-minded vehicle. Fig 2 reflects the time taken for finding a like
vehicle under the different size of interest. 
 
 
Figure. 2 : Time Taken For 
8. RELATED WORK 
 
Recently, several research works have been reported [5], [6], which are closely related to the 
proposed FLIP protocol, but focus on other scenarios different from VANETs. Different from the 
other works, Rongxing Lu [3,4] proposed FLIP protocol, can provide
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algorithm lies in the efficiency of base point selection. So, in this paper, we tried to give an 
efficient base point algorithm through which the security of ECDSA increases thereby increasing 
the security of FLIP algorithm. Also the overall computational cost is also found to be reduced to 
a good extent and more importantly, it is a provably secure protocol suitable for VANET 
scenarios.  
 
9. CONCLUSION  
 
Protecting vehicle’s IP can be done by secure finding like-minded vehicles protocol (FLIP) and 
its importance is hugely related to the success of vehicle chatting application on the road. But, 
this scenario hasn’t paid enough attention in VANET. In this paper, we have tried to study the 
FLIP protocol, which is an efficient IP preserving protocol, and tried to make it more secure by 
making changes in the base point thereby reducing the overall computational cost and taking sha-
256 as the hash function which is better than the traditional SHA-1 and others in terms of 
security. In addition, the vehicle’s IP is also preserved that is because the protocol keeps each 
other’s IP-preserving if two vehicles don’t have the common interest and so, it can be widely 
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